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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Sec. 78-2-2(3)(j). The order appealed from is a 
final order disposing of all claims of all parties. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Kirberg had 
failed to produce sufficient facts to create a jury question 
whether the initial "at-will" relationship of the parties had been 
modified by subsequent representations and conduct of West One. 
The standard of review is correction of error, since a grant of 
summary judgment presents a question of law only. Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 977, 1000 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative authority for this appeal is Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), and Brehanv v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case: 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Hon. Frank G. Noel. 
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2. Course of Proceedings: 
Kirberg filed a complaint for breach of implied contract, and 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She alleged 
that West One had violated an implied promise not to terminate her 
without cause. This termination was alleged to also violate an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The count 
relating to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was dismissed 
by agreement of the parties. 
West One moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining 
complaint for breach of implied contract. West One relied upon a 
disclaimer of any implied promise regarding termination without 
cause. This disclaimer was found in the fine print of Kirberg's 
employment application form. Kirberg opposed the motion with her 
affidavit, setting forth what she was told, the termination 
practices she observed, and the employee manual, giving the basis 
for her understanding that West One had a corporate policy against 
termination without cause. Kirberg specifically averred that the 
any initial at-will relationship had been modified by subsequent 
representations and conduct. 
West One also argued that it had "cause" for terminating 
Kirberg. Kirberg opposed this motion by averring that she was 
historically a good employee, and that she had acted reasonably in 
handling a difficult situation. 
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3. Disposition in Lower Court: 
The trial court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that West 
One was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the 
written disclaimer in the employment application form. The trial 
court did not rule on whether there was a jury question as to just 
cause for terminating Kirberg. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Kirberg was hired by West One in October, 1988 as a bank 
teller. (R. 41). When she applied for work at West One, she 
filled out an application form. This form contained, in fine 
print, a short statement that Kirberg could be "discharged at any 
time without notice and without cause." (R. 118). Further, the 
form even stated in the fine print that there was "no express or 
implied employment contract between [her] and the company [West 
One]". (R. 118). Kirberg never read the disclaimer of implied 
terms or the disclaimer of requirement of just cause when she was 
hired as a teller. It was simply included in the forms she was to 
fill out. It was never referred to in the employment interview, 
and there was no oral statement made to her that she could be fired 
without cause. (R. 93, 12). 
Since summary judgment was granted against Kirberg, the 
facts in the record are construed most strongly against West One. 
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The disclaimers given Kirberg when she was hired as a teller 
were never referred to again, in either her own employment, or 
regarding the employment of others. (R. 93, f2). There was no 
evidence that Kirberg was given a copy of the application form* 
In February, 1989, Kirberg was promoted from teller to branch 
manager of the West Jordan branch of West One bank. (R. 41). As 
branch manager, Kirberg's duties included personnel issues in the 
West One branch. This in turn included employee discipline and 
termination issues. (R. 94, 16). Kirberg was given a Human 
Resource Policy Manual, to use in employee matters involving 
employees under her. A copy of a portion of the Manual entitled 
"Dismissal" is attached to this affidavit. (R. 94, 57). 
The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of 
progressive steps of employee discipline, starting with supervisory 
counseling, and verbal warning, and escalating to written 
reprimand, probation, suspension and dismissal. The Manual advises 
that the severity of the problem is related to the degree of 
discipline. (R. 94, f8-9). Kirberg understood from reading the 
Manual, from observing the employee discipline practices around 
her, and was advised and trained as a branch manager, that any 
discipline should be at the lightest (least) level necessary to 
correct the problem. (R. 94, 18-9). Further, Kirberg understood, 
and was trained (as a branch manager), that an employee's problems 
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needed to be fully documented or proved before they could be 
disciplined, to justify the severity of any action taken, (R. 94, 
110). 
Kirberg was specifically taught that a West One employee was 
not to be fired without cause. (R. 94, 111). Further, in the 
hiring/firing practices Kirberg observed, no employee was ever 
fired without cause. (R. 94, 111). In fact, there were at least 
two instances where Kirberg wanted to dismiss an employee under her 
for poor judgment and/or performance, but was told she could not by 
her superiors. Instead, Kirberg was told that she must first 
counsel the employee, and warn them. In one instance, the employee 
was simply not showing up for work. This person was ultimately 
transferred to another department. (R. 94, 112). 
The only instance where someone under Kirberg was dismissed, 
involved someone who admitted to stealing customer's money. (R. 94, 
113). Even this for-cause dismissal did not come until after the 
employee personally confessed; prior to the confession, Kirberg was 
not allowed to dismiss her. (R. 94, 113). Based upon what Kirberg 
was told, taught, read, and observed, she reached a clear 
understanding that West One had a policy of not firing people 
without cause. (R. 94, 111). 
During the time of Kirberg's employment, her conduct was 
exemplary, and she never received any substandard written employee 
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reviews. (R. 2). In January, 1991, she was evaluated as an 
employee, and given good marks and an 8% pay raise. (R. 88-92). 
However, in late 1990, at a Chamber of Commerce meeting, Kirberg 
had heard an unsubstantiated rumor that Dr. Robert Davis, a medical 
doctor with substantial deposits at West One, and a substantial 
existing loan, had been charged with rape and Medicaid fraud. (R. 
43, 113; 44, 117; 96, 116). Kirberg was told that the problems 
were several years old, and had been resolved. (R. 96, 116). 
Kirberg checked his loans, and found they were all current. (R. 96, 
117). Davis' loans remained current, and at least one has been 
completely paid off. (R. 96, 118). 
In early 1991, Davis sought another loan from West One. (R. 
96, 119). At the time of Davis' application for all his loans, 
branch managers such as Kirberg were directed to submit loan 
applications to a loan officer for review. Accordingly, Kirberg 
referred Davis' loan application to the loan officer for his review 
and approval. (R. 96, 120). Shortly thereafter, Kirberg learned 
that the FBI was at that moment investigating Davis. (R. 96, 121). 
Kirberg immediately called the loan officer, and told him to be 
cautious in deciding whether to give a loan to Davis. Kirberg 
explained to him that the FBI was apparently investigating Davis. 
(R. 96, 121). 
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Once West One confirmed that Davis was being investigated by 
the FBI, they fired Kirberg for failing to tell them in late 1990 
about his legal problems. (R. 46, 126). Kirberg was fired despite 
the fact that Davis met the ordinary loan underwriting guidelines 
of West One, and West One had no way to call Davis' loans anyway. 
(R. 96, 515, 22-25). Kirberg was fired despite the fact that she 
was told that Davis' legal problems were several years old, and had 
been resolved. (R. 96, 116). West One never alleged that it lost 
one penny from Davis' accounts. The inference (most favorable to 
Kirberg) is that West One simply overreacted to hearing bad news 
about a customer, and fired a good branch manager in a panic. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kirberg was initially an "at-will" employee of West One. 
Kirberg averred that there was a subsequent agreement that she 
would not be fired except for cause. A jury could find this 
modification was created by subsequent statements of Kirberg's West 
One supervisors, the use and construction given the Employee 
Manual, and the actual employee termination practices of West One. 
The trial court erred by assuming that these facts, assumed to be 
true, were insufficient to modify the initial "at-will" 
relationship. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KIRBERG'S INITIAL "AT-WILL" CONTRACT WITH WEST ONE 
WAS MODIFIED BY WEST ONE'S CONDUCT AND STATEMENTS 
A. An Express At-Will Employment Contract Can Be Modified By 
Subsequent Representations and Conduct, 
An "at-will" employment relationship can be modified by a 
subsequent express or implied agreement. Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). In Johnson, all five 
justices of the Supreme Court agreed that an initial written "at-
will" agreement found in an employee manual could be modified by a 
subsequent express or implied agreement: 
. . . it is true that subsequent expressed or implied 
agreements could have modified the [written] at-will 
employment relationship [found in the handbook]. . .". 
Johnson, at 1004. The majority and the concurrence both clearly 
agreed that "an express contract can be modified by a subsequent 
implied contract." Johnson, at 1004, fn. 29; see also 1005-1006. 
Accord, Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio App. 
1984) (subsequent oral promises negated written disclaimer in policy 
manual). 
This is simply the flip side of the proposition that an 
employment contract can be modified to include an "at-will" 
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provision. See Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F.Supp. 1128 (D. 
Ariz. 1988)(after 14 years, employer added at-will disclaimer); 
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).2 
See also Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks; 
Further Encroachment on the Employment at Will Doctrine, 139 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 197, 216-219 (1991). What an employer can take away, 
it certainly can give back. 
B. Kirberq's Evidence Raised A Jury Question Whether The "At-Will" 
Relationship Had Been Modified. 
An employment agreement can be modified in the same ways that 
it can be created: 
The evidence that is relevant . . . includes the language 
of the manual itself, the employer's course of conduct, 
and pertinent oral representations. 
Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991). See also 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) 
which stated that the at-will relationship could be modified by 
"employment manuals, oral agreements, and all circumstances which 
demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause . . .", as well 
as "conduct of parties, announced personnel policies, practices of 
that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances". 
These cases were cited with approval by the majority 
opinion in Johnson. 
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Johnson held that the language of the manual itself, could not 
modify a statement in that same manual which set forth an "at-will" 
relationship. Johnson had only relied upon the manual; there were 
apparently no other representations, personnel practices or course 
of conduct that went beyond the manual. 
In contrast, Kirberg averred that she was taught that she 
could not fire employees, except for cause. Kirberg stated that 
when she tried to fire incompetent employees, she was told she 
could not, because there was not cause. She was further taught 
that the Employee Manual restricted termination, except for 
documented, serious problems. Whether this construction of the 
Manual was legally correct or not, that is how the Manual was used 
in practice. Finally, the employee termination practices that she 
observed strongly indicated that West One employees were not to be 
terminated without documented cause. 
Johnson, at 1002, held that the "express statements of the 
employer" were sufficient to modify an "at-will" relationship. 
Kirberg relied not only upon the express statements of the 
employer, but the Employee Manual, its construction and use in 
practice, and the course of conduct of West One in its employee 
termination practices. These were "communicated to the employee 
[Kirberg]", they were "sufficiently definite to operate as a 
contract provision", and were such that Kirberg could "reasonably 
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believe" West One's statements and conduct. Johnson. at 1002. A 
jury could easily find that West One modified the fine print by its 
subsequent words and actions. 
C. West One's Disclaimer Could Be Modified. Despite Its "Non-
modification" Language. 
West One's disclaimer in the application form stated that no 
company representative had authority to modify the disclaimer. (R. 
118). In Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co* of America, 763 P.2d 761, 
768 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that an insurance 
agent could modify or waive provisions in an insurance application, 
despite "boilerplate nonwaiver provisions if the insured reasonably 
relied upon the agent's representations to the contrary. [Citations 
omitted]." There is likewise no reason why a bank official should 
not be able to modify an employment agreement, despite "boilerplate 
nonwaiver provisions" in the employment application. 
The question of whether Kirberg was reasonable in relying upon 
the representations and conduct of West One is one for the jury. 
See Hardy v. Prudential, supra, at 769. Kirberg stated that she 
was never aware of the disclaimers in the employment application, 
and that they were never referred to in her training about employee 
termination practices. Under these circumstances, a jury could 
find her reliance upon what she was told and observed to be 
reasonable. 
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D. Employees Should Not Be Manipulated By Oral Promises of Job 
Security, Coupled With Contrary Written Disclaimers. 
Employers use promises of job security as a motivational 
device to encourage employee loyalty and productivity. See Note, 
Challenging the Employment-at-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract 
Theory, 16 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 449 (1983). On the other hand, ". . . 
arbitrary discharge creates severe financial and emotional 
hardships for employees who have relied upon express or implied 
assurances of job security." Id. 
West One argued successfully to the trial court that use of a 
written disclaimer could not be overcome with subsequent express 
representations and conduct promising job security. West One's 
position, which ignores the holding of Johnson, is patently 
unreasonable. If West One is correct, an employer can lie to an 
employee for 45 years, stating that the employee will only be fired 
for cause. However, if the employer had the foresight to insert a 
disclaimer in the original application form, the unfortunate 
employee would be without a remedy as a matter of law if 
arbitrarily fired 45 years later. Or, if the employee periodically 
inserts the disclaimer on the back of paychecks, or in other 
inconspicuous places, it will insulate itself from complying with 
its promises of job security. But it was these abuses of the 
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employer/employee relationship that Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989)f and its progeny sought to correct. 
This court should not give a judicial blessing to West One's 
practice of promising job security to motivate hard work and 
loyalty from its employees, while inserting disclaimers into job 
application forms. Most employees will not be sophisticated enough 
to realize that West One's promises are contradicted by the fine 
print. Few employees will have the bargaining power necessary to 
negotiate a revision to the job application form. The relationship 
is one of great inequality; by definition, one party is hoping for 
a job from the other. This job is given as a matter of grace, and 
prospective employees are exceedingly unlikely to even ask 
questions about the meaning of fine print in the application form. 
Given this relationship, the subsequent promises and conduct 
of the employer should be given equal or greater weight than a 
self-serving disclaimer inserted in an application form or employee 
manual. The written disclaimers should simply be considered by the 
jury in connection with all other manifestations of contractual 
intent, to determine whether there was an express or implied 
promise of job security. 
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CONCLUSION 
West One wants to have its cake, and eat it too. On the one 
hand, it promotes employee dedication and loyalty through job 
security promises and practices. On the other hand, it wants to 
retain the right to violate these promises at its whim, by use of 
disclaimers. 
If the mere use of disclaimers is sufficient to insulate 
employers from being held to their subsequent promises, then 
working class people have every reason to view the justice system 
with cynicism. The courts are not so helpless, however, If a jury 
finds that West One has contradicted its written disclaimer by 
subsequent promises and/or conduct, West One should be held 
accountable. 
DATED this / day of December, 1992. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of December, 1992, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the following, by depositing four 
copies thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss 
111 East Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Daniel F. Bertch 
15 
DEC 2 1992 
COURT OF APPEAR 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA KIRBERG, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal No. 920706-CA 
Category 16 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
Daniel F. Bertch, A4728 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-7406 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss & Saperstein 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
MINUTE ENTRY OF DISTRICT COURT - 6/29/92 iii 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA KIRBERG iv 
EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION v 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . '."*'. . . . . . . . . . ^i 
ii 
MINUTE ENTRY OF DISTRICT COURT - 6/29/92 
iii 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA J. KIRBERG, MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, Case No. 910901640 CV 
vs. JUDGE FRANK G, NOEL, 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant. 
Now before the Court is defendant West One Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the memos and 
affidavits filed* in connection therewith, has heard oral 
argument and having taken the matter 11 under advisement now rules 
as follows: 
It is clear to the Court that the initial employment 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant under the facts of 
this case was an Mat-will" employment relationship. The 
question before the Court is whether there is sufficient facts 
to create a triable issue as to whether the parties intended to 
modify the employment relationship to limit the defendant's 
KIRBERG V. WEST ONE BANK PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
ability to terminate plaintiff, Kirberg argues that certain 
conduct of the defendant and certain procedures set out in the 
employee manuals created an implied-in-fact contract providing 
that she could be terminated only for good cause. 
It is important to note that the application signed by 
plaintiff and the employment manual in effect throughout 
Kirberg#s employment contained disclaimers expressly stating 
that she could be discharged without notice and without cause, 
that there was no express or implied employment contract between 
her irid the company and further that adherence to the policies 
and guidelines contained in the code of conduct did not 
constitute an expressed or implied contract. The Court has 
reviewed the facts which plaintiff relies on to support her 
claim that in spite of the disclaimers there yas an implied in 
fact contract between plaintiff and defendant and that could be 
terminated only for good cause. The Court finds those facts 
relied on by plaintiff to be insufficient to create a triable 
issue of fact as to an implied in fact contract and therefore 
grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent with 
this ruling and submit jit to the Court for signature. 
DATED this ^H^ d aY o f June, 1992. 
FRANK G. NOE 
DISTRICT COO 
AFFIDAVl'l' <>!• PATRICIA KIRBERG 
iv 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
l ? 3 2 3«.PH ,9Z 
i r . K ) "!• '.-» DISTRICT 
S,\N U - t CCUIITY 
Daniel F. Bertch, A4728 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-7406 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA J. KIRBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WEST ONE BANK, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J. ¥ IKDERG 
Case No- 910901640 CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Patricia J. Kirberg, having been duly sworn, states and 
alleges under oath as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this matter, and have personal 
knowledge of the following. 
2, I never read the disclaimer of implied terms or the 
disclaimer of requirement of just cause when I was hired as a 
teller. It was simply included in the forms I was to fill out. It 
was never referred to in the employment interview, and there was no 
statement made to me that I could be fired without cause. 
00O0C3 
3. The disclaimers given me when I was hired as a teller 
were never referred to again, in either my own employment, or the 
employment of others. 
4 I received no further disclaimers, except that sometime 
in 1990, a code of ethics booklet was distributed to all employees. 
There was no discussion of the specifics of the booklet with 
anyone, and especially not concerning any disclaimer relating to 
any right to fire employees without cause. 
5. The code of ethics disclaimer was never referred to again 
in either my own employment, or the employment of others. 
6. As branch manager, my duties included personnel issues in 
my branch. This in turn included employee discipline and 
termination issues. 
7. I was given a Human Resource Policy Manual, to use in 
employee matters involving employees under me. A copy of a portion 
of the Manual entitled "Dismissal" is attached to this affidavit. 
8. The Human Resource Policy Manual sets forth a system of 
progressive steps of employee discipline, including supervisory 
counseling, verbal warning, written reprimand, probation, 
suspension and dismissal. 
9. The Manual advises that the severity of the problem is 
related to the degree of discipline. The understanding 1 drew from 
the Manual, the employee discipline practices I observed, and the 
2 
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advice and training I received as a branch manager was that the 
discipline should be at the lightest (least) level necessary to 
correct the problem. 
10* Further, I understood, and was trained, that an 
employee's problems needed to be fully documented or proved before 
they could be disciplined, to justify the severity of any action 
taken. 
11. It was my understanding from the practices I observed, 
and I was taught, that an employee was not fired arbitrarily or 
without cause. I cannot think of a single instance where this 
happened. 
12. There were at least two instances where I wanted to 
dismiss an employee under her for poor judgment and/or performance, 
but I was told she could not by my superiors. Instead, I was told 
that I must first counsel the employee, and warn them. In one 
instance, the employee was simply not showing up for work. This 
person was ultimately transferred to another department. 
13. The only instance where someone under me was dismissed, 
involved someone who admitted to stealing customer's money. Even 
this dismissal did not come until after the employee personally 
confessed; prior to the confession, I was not allowed to dismiss 
her. 
14. At the time I submitted Dr. Davis' loan applications, I 
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had no knowledge of his problems with the State of Utah, with his 
former employees, or with his patients. 
15. Dr. Davis solicited the lo&n applications that I 
forwarded, and he satisfied the normal credit guidelines for 
approving loans by the loan processing center. The applications do 
not ask if a person has ever had any charges brought against them, 
or ever been accused of overcharging a customer. In fact, we were 
told not to inquire about other personal information, other than 
what was on the application form. 
16. I did hear an unsubstantiated rumor in November, 1990, 
about Dr. Davis being charged with rape, overcharging customers and 
unspecified Medicaid regulation violations. I was told that all 
the problems had been resolved in the past, and specifically, that 
any criminal charges had been dismissed. I understood the problems 
to be at least several years old. 
17. At the time I heard these rumors (in November, 1990), I 
did not know if it were true. However, to protect West One, I 
checked Dr. Davis1 loans, and found that they were all current. 
18. To the best of my knowledge, Dr. Davis' loans with West 
One are, and have been, current at all times. In fact, the only 
loan made to Dr. Davis after I heard the rumors, of $30,000.00, was 
paid off in February, 1992. 
19. In January, 1991, Dr. Davis sought another loan to re-
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finance his business obligations. 
20. At the time of Dr. Davis' application for all his loans, 
branch managers were directed to submit loan applications to Tim 
Conklin, a loan officer, for his review. Accordingly, I referred 
Dr. Davis' loan application to Tim Conklin for his review and 
approval. 
21. Subsequently, in January, 1991, I was told by my daughter 
that the FBI was in Dr. Davis' office. I immediately called 
Conklin, and told him to be cautious in deciding whether to give a 
loan to Dr. Davis. I explained to him that the FBI was apparently 
investigating Dr. Davis. 
22. The unsubstantiated rumor I heard about Dr. Davis was not 
enough to have called the existing loans, nor did Dr. Davis' 
objective financial situation warrant any action on my part. 
23. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to 
and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been charged with rape, but had the charges 
dismissed later. No customer was ever asked this question. 
24. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to 
and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been accused of overcharging by a disgruntled 
customer. No customer was ever asked this question. 
25. At the time that I submitted Dr. Davis' loans, and up to 
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and including my dismissal, West One had no policy barring loans to 
anyone who had ever been accused of violating governmental business 
regulations. No customer was ever asked this question. 
26. The only prior occasions when I received discipline were 
for security problems with the people under me. Specifically, the 
employees involved had failed to lock an outer vault door on one 
occasion, and failed to lock a cash drawer on another. 
27. The risk to the bank from these prior incidents was much 
greater than the risk it faced from Dr. Davis' loans. However, I 
received only a written reprimand from these prior instances. 
28. In my three years of employment with West One, I had 
observed a number of situations where an employee had been asked to 
make a judgment call, and in hindsight, had made the call the wrong 
way. None of these employees were dismissed, even though it cost 
the bank money on some occasions. 
29. It is my belief that my decision not to pass on 
unsubstantiated rumors about claims made regarding a medical 
doctor's past conduct was a judgment call on my part. I felt that 
I owed it to Dr. Davis not to spread rumors that might have been 
very damaging, and very false. 
30. Whether my judgment was right or wrong, it was not 
sufficient grounds to dismiss me, when judged against the prior 
instances of dismissal of West One employees. 
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FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2,3 day of March, 1992. 
^^A^C4J 
SUBS 
1992 
P a t r i c i a Kibrberc( ^ ^ 
P ftWQf&k~>to b e f o r e me t h i s c?«3 d a y of M a r c h , 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
M/Comm«s ion Expires 
September M, 1995 
RANDEE ROUSE 
3540 South 4000 West, Sutte 100 
West Valey City, Utah 84120 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
i/nln 
R e s i d i n g a t : 
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000 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the March, 1992, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA J. 
KIRBERG upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the 
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss & Saperstein 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Daniel F. Bertch 
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4PLOYEE RELATIONS Discipline HRPM 130 
ORPORATE POLICY 
•nployees of Moore Financial Group whose Job performance or conduct Is 
ibstandard or who violate corporate or affiliate policies, practices, or 
jgulatlons are subject to disciplinary action. Depending on the severity of 
le problem, disciplinary action may result in progressive discipline, a 
jgotlated voluntary separation, or Immediate involuntary separation. 
he company encourages harmonious working relationships among 
jpervisors and employees. If possible, problems should be resolved on an 
iformal basis . If more serious action is appropriate, the following 
IscipUnary actions should be considered. 
• Supervisory counseling 
• Verbal warning 
• Written reprimand 
• Probation 
• Suspension 
• Dismissal. 
rltten documentation of the problem and the actions taken to correct it are 
elpful as a basis for avoiding misunderstanding of the Issues involved, 
itabllshlng a record of corrective action agreed upon, and knowing if the 
roblem has been resolved or if more progressive disciplinary action is appro-
bate . Documentation is also helpful as a basis for fair and honest perfor-
ance evaluations. 
ORPORATE GUIDELINES 
i 
11 forms of disciplinary action, be they counseling sess ions, verbal 
arnings, reprimands, probation, suspension and-or dismissals should be 
ocumented by the immedite supervisor. Contact your appropriate Human 
Resource department for assistance In carrying through disciplinary action. 
HAR
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EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION 
V 
MATV.f/41. national origin, handicap, or any other basis prohibited by local, siaie, or 
federal law APPLICATION 
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STAATING SALARY 
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Hmz DATE 
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STAfTTfNG POSfTtON 
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STARTING SALARY 
ENOING SALARY 
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ONE NUMBER REASON FOR LEAVING 
PERVlSOR S NAME MAY WE CONTACT? 
• YES D NO 
HIRE DATE 
LAST DATE 
STA/YT1NG POSIT JON 
ENOING POSITION 
STARTING SALARY 
ENDING SALARY 
)MPANY NAME AND AOORESS 
«ONE NUMBER 
"VfSOR S NAME 
»iMARY JOB RESPONSIBILITIES 
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REASON FOR LEAVING 
MAY WE CONTACT' 
D YES D NO 
STARTINO POSITION 
ENDING POSITION 
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| j EXHIBIT 
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D DICTATING EQUIPMENT Q-0ATA ENTRY / KEYPUNCH 
Indicate any other skills which may qualify you for the position you seek 
• PROOF OPERATION 
rou have any handicaps or health problems which would interfere with or affect the successful performance of the job for which you are applying or which you would like 
51 to take into account in determining your job placement? If yes, please describe any specific reasonable accommodations MFGI can make that would assist you in working here 
YES 
e you ever been convicted of a criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust (including but not limited to robbery, embezzlement forgery perjury, tax evasion 
shoplifting)? If yes, please explain 
YES G T N O 
A cocwctho wtH not nocessanty bar applicant from emphynwnt 
ny company has ever refused to issue a bond for you. please explain (include name of the bonding company and when this happened) 
x>u have ever been terminated from employment, please explain 
Jo 
iase explain your career interests and goals and any particular Interest you have in banking and employment with Moore Financial Group 
••
£f-£ y^' y)*J{< t c j 
IfliNctt^ «*• IU-QJLS,* pccy2.cz. UJ/^t/i. -//bus //?#Uy /LCfcfe„ 
U Wit* /7t£/ y?4^./ 
lucational records pertaining to my attendance, course work ana other school activities authorize the release of all high school, college, or other ed i l 
further consent to the disclosure of any and all Information about me contained in private and government files relevant to this application for employment 
>r relating to my present and former employment history, and I request all present and former employers and federal, state and local government agencies 
o supply this Information to you on your request You are also authorized to make any investigation of my personal history and financial and credit record 
hrough any Investigative or credit agencies or bureaus of your choice 
hereby ask my present and former employers to furnish you any personnel information you request and I release my present and former employers from 
any liability that may arise as a result of their providing this information to Moore Financial Group 
• understand and agree that If I am employed by Moore Financial Group or any of its related companies or subsidiaries (the "company"), that I may resign 
* may be discharged at any time without notice and without cause I understand no company representative has any authority to enler into an agreement 
.h me different or contrary to the foregoing I also understand that if I accept employment, there is no express or implied employment contract between 
me and the company I agree to comply with all of the company's policies and procedures 
certify that all statements made by me on this application are true and complete I underst 
\ this application constitute grounds for immediate dismissal. / 
that misrepresentations or falsification 
y / ? 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of December, 1992, I 
served four true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the following, by depositing copies thereof 
in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Dunning 
Carolyn Cox 
Watkiss & Saperstein 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Daniel F. Bertch 
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